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ABSTRACT
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) is the largest revision to the patent statute in over
sixty years. One might ask whether the AIA changed the balance between trade secret law and
patent law and what the new relationship will be between these different approaches to protecting
technology. This article answers four particular questions that arise in addressing this topic. First,
what, if anything, the AIA says specifically about trade secrets; second, whether someone who
commercially uses a trade secret for over one year can patent it under the AIA; third, whether a new
inventor may patent an invention that was secretly used by a third party as a trade secret; and
fourth, assuming that a later-conceived invention is patentable to a new inventor, whether such a
patent is enforceable against the prior trade secret user in light of the prior user defense as revised
by the AIA.
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THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT ON TRADE SECRETS
EDWARD D. MANZO*
I. INTRODUCTION
Trade secret law has long been an integral component of intellectual property
law. It developed as common law in the states (and later was made statutory) to
provide remedies against the misappropriation, improper acquisition, or disclosure of
“trade secrets”—various types of information used in business and providing an
advantage over competitors who lack knowledge of it, provided that reasonable
efforts are made to maintain its secrecy.1 One policy of trade secret law is to
* © Edward D. Manzo 2014. Edward D. Manzo is a partner in the Chicago office of Husch
Blackwell LLP where he handles all aspects of patents and patent litigation in federal courts and
the USPTO. He was President of the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC) for
2010-11 and chairs its Council of Past Presidents. As an adjunct professor of law, he taught the
patent law doctrinal course, and he teaches CLE for Patent Resources Group on the America
Invents Act. He is author or lead author of four books for Thomson Reuters Westlaw. His newest
title is THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT: A GUIDE TO PATENT LITIGATION AND PROCEDURE, (Feb. 2013,
Nov. 2013). Other titles are PATENT REFORM 2011—THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT:
COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS (2011, 2012), PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
(2006 et seq.) and PATENT CLAIM INTERPRETATION-GLOBAL EDITION (2008 et seq.). All but one of
these are annual publications. The views expressed here are not the opinion or views of Husch
Blackwell LLP.
1 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf. Section 1 provides:

As used in this [Act], unless the context requires otherwise: (1) “Improper means”
includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a
duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means; (2)
“Misappropriation” means: (i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person
who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper
means; or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or
implied consent by a person who (A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of
the trade secret; or (B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to
know that his knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived from or through a
person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; (II) acquired under
circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (III)
derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (C) before a material change of his [or her]
position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. (3) “Person” means a
natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association,
joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal
or commercial entity. (4) “Trade secret” means information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
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maintain “standards of commercial ethics.”2 Trade secret law generally does not
provide absolute rights in the sense that it does not protect against discovery of a
secret by a third party through independent invention, discovery by reverse
engineering (assuming fair and honest acquisition of a known product), discovery
under a license from a lawful trade secret owner, observation of the item embodying
the secret in public use or on public display, or obtaining the secret from published
literature.3
Patent law is another integral part of intellectual property law. It is established
by a constitutionally authorized federal statute to incentivize the advancement of
technological arts and, unlike trade secret law, provides for the public disclosure of
inventions in exchange for granting a right to the inventor to exclude others from
practicing the invention for a limited time.4 Because patents are public documents,5
a plaintiff asserting patent infringement need not show that an alleged infringer
used “improper means” to obtain knowledge of the invention, as the patent statute
defines infringement as the unauthorized manufacture, use, sale, offer for sale,
importation, etc. of the patented invention during the term of the patent6 and
provides remedies against infringement.7 Unlike trade secret law, copying the
patented invention when it was on public display is not a defense to patent
infringement,8 because the patent is a public document that by its very nature is
designed to enable relevant members of the public to make and use the invention
when the patent right expires.9 Also unlike trade secret law, independently
inventing the subject matter is not a defense to patent infringement.10 Thus, patent
law provides much stronger protection than trade secret law in several respects.11
Despite the profound differences in approach but considering the different goals
that trade secret law and patent law serve, the Supreme Court confirmed the
compatibility of trade secret law with patent law. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., the Court held that Ohio’s law of trade secrets is not preempted by the U.S.
patent laws and that Ohio could grant legal protection to processes and

Id.; see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, LIABILITY FOR DISCLOSURE OR USE OF ANOTHER’S TRADE
SECRET—GENERAL PRINCIPLE § 757 (1939).
2 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985) (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470 (1974)).
3 Id.
4 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
5 35 U.S.C. §§ 10–12, 151, 154(a) (2012).
6 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
7 35 U.S.C. §§ 281–89.
8 It is a defense, however, if the invention was made “available to the public” more than one
year before the effective filing date of the patent application. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a),(b) (post-AIA);
§102(b) (pre-AIA).
9 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a), 154(a)(1) (2012).
10 Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 475, 475 (2006).
11 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489–90 (1974) (stating that trade secret
law provides far weaker protection in many respects than the patent law).
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manufacturing techniques that were patentable subject matter but where the owner
or inventor had forfeited the right to seek a patent by the passage of time.12
The U.S. patent statute was the subject of reform efforts for over a decade but
the reforms never reached consummation until 2011 when Congress passed and the
President signed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”).13 The AIA is the
largest revision to the patent statute in over sixty years, if not more, and one must
now ask whether the AIA changed the balance between trade secret law and patent
law and what the new relationship will be between these different approaches to
protecting technology.
This essay answers four particular questions that arise in considering this topic.
Section I answers the threshold question of what, if anything, the AIA says
specifically about trade secrets. Section II considers the question of whether someone
who commercially used a trade secret for an extended time (over one year) can patent
it under the AIA. Section III considers the situation where someone else had
commercially but secretly used it. Section IV assumes that a later-conceived or
discovered invention is patentable to a new inventor and treats the question of
whether such a patent is enforceable against the prior trade secret user in light of the
prior user defense (35 U.S.C. § 273) as expanded by the AIA.
II. THE AIA REFERENCE TO TRADE SECRETS
The AIA does mention trade secrets specifically, but only in one place. AIA
Section 3(m) calls for the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) Director to report on
prior user rights: that report “shall include the following . . . (E) An analysis of legal
and constitutional issues, if any, that arise from placing trade secret law in patent
law.”14
One may ponder what this AIA phrase meant, for the AIA did not relocate the
trade secret jurisprudence into the patent law at all. Instead, it enhanced the prior
user rights defense, and in January 2012, the PTO issued the mandated report,
entitled “Report on the Prior User Rights Defense” (“Report”).15 The PTO concluded
that the revised defense has no direct impact on trade secret law and that a prior
user (whether the use is secret or not) who meets the statutory provisions of 35
U.S.C. § 273 can continue to practice the subject matter despite a later patent that
the user otherwise would infringe.16 Relating the law of trade secrets to the patent
law, the Report traced some history. It noted that a prior user would have the right

12 Id.; see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 260, 262 (1979) (holding that
patent law does not preempt state contract law to preclude enforcement of a contract for royalty).
13 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) [hereinafter
AIA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
14 35 U.S.C. § 3(m)(1)(E).
15 See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE
PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE 1–60 (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/
20120113-pur_report.pdf.
16 Id. at 48.
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to continue its use despite a patent issued under the 1839 Patent Act.17 Following
various revisions, that provision was repealed in the 1952 patent act but resurrected
in 1999 for a special purpose.18
The Report tendered various findings and recommendations. Findings 7–8 and
Recommendation 4 are particularly important to the continued vitality of trade
secret law:
Finding 7: A prior use defense to patent infringement is Constitutional and
lawful and the defense is consistent with the Constitution and Supreme
Court precedent recognizing that trade secret law and patent law can and
do legally co-exist in the United States, and indeed have co-existed since our
Constitution was created.19
Finding 8: Trade secret protection is of considerable value to United States
businesses and the United States economy, and as such, there are
compelling economic and policy justifications for providing a prior user
rights defense to patent infringement.20
Recommendation 4: United States patent law should provide for a prior
user rights defense as an appropriate balance between trade secret
protection and patent protection, which legally co-exist to provide
competitive advantages for United States businesses.21
As can be seen, the PTO found no basis to condemn trade secret law as
unconstitutional, preempted, or not valuable. Instead, U.S. patent law should
continue to coexist with trade secret law and provide competitive advantages.
III. WHETHER ONE’S OWN EXTENDED TRADE SECRET USE PRECLUDES PATENTABILITY
UNDER THE AIA
The fundamental question addressed in this section is whether the AIA makes
old trade secrets patent-eligible for the trade secret user.22 Of course, this means

17 See id. at 43 (“Section 7 of the 1839 Patent Act stated that any person who constructed or
purchased a new invention prior to the patent application for that invention had the right to use and
sell that invention without liability to the patent holder.”).
18 Id. at 43–44 (“This provision was revised from time-to-time and was ultimately repealed in
1952 as ‘unnecessary and redundant.’ In 1999, in the wake of a Federal Circuit decision that
confirmed the patentability of business methods, a prior use defense was added solely to protect
prior users of business methods.”) (internal citations omitted).
19 Id. at 45.
20 Id. at 47.
21 Id.
22 See Gene Quinn, Trade Secrets Now Patentable, IPWATCHDOG (Sep. 18, 2013, 8:30 AM),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/09/18/aia-oddities-trade-secrets-re-patenting-and-bestmode/id=45108/ (proclaiming that “[t]rade [s]ecrets [n]ow [p]atentable” and “[t]his will seem almost
unbelievable to many, but as of March 16, 2013, long held trade secrets are now patentable. In fact,
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that the trade secret owner is prepared to surrender the protections of trade secret
law when a patent is issuing or the underlying patent application is being published
eighteen months after the earliest filing date.
A threshold question asks who is seeking the patent.
Recall that the
constitutional enabling provision underlying the legislative power to provide for
patents specifically names “inventors” as recipients of exclusive rights.23 The AIA did
not remove the statutory mandate that patents are to be granted only to inventors or
their assignees.24 Section 101 of the patent statute remains unchanged by the AIA
and provides, “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”25 Accordingly, a partial answer is immediately
clear: if the trade secret user is not the inventor or inventor’s assignee, that trade
secret user is barred from obtaining a patent on that subject matter due to lack of
inventorship.26 This is the case under both the pre-AIA and post-AIA versions of the
patent statute.
Assume the requisite fact, i.e., that the trade secret user contemplating seeking
patent protection on the secret is in fact the inventor, assignee of the inventor, or a
person to whom the inventor had an obligation to assign the invention.27 Traditional
jurisprudence in the U.S. has long held that an inventor would have to elect between
trade secret protection or patent protection.28 Courts would not abide the notion that
should Coca-Cola want to patent a secret process for making Coke they would be able to do so. But
how is that possible?”).
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24 35 U.S.C. § 100(f) (2012). Indeed, the AIA added a definition of “inventor” to the patent
statute, defining it as “the individual or, if a joint invention, the individuals collectively who
invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.” Id.
25 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
26 35 U.S.C §§ 111(a)(1), 115, 118.
While it is true that the AIA removed former §102(f)
(wherein one did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented) from the statute, the
inventorship requirement is still embodied in Section 101 as quoted in the main text and other parts
of the statute. 35 U.S.C. § 102. An inventor or an individual authorized by an inventor must apply
for patent. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) (stating that application shall be made or authorized to be
made by the inventor); 35 U.S.C. § 115 (requiring an inventor’s oath or declaration); 35 U.S.C. § 118
(stating that assignee of an inventor may file the application for patent); Teets v. Chromalloy Gas
Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Ownership springs from invention.”).
27 35 U.S.C. § 118.
Another category of patent applicant is stated in the post-AIA patent
statute. Section 118, as amended, provides:
A person who otherwise shows sufficient proprietary interest in the matter may
make an application for patent on behalf of and as agent for the inventor on proof
of the pertinent facts and a showing that such action is appropriate to preserve
the rights of the parties. If the Director grants a patent on an application filed
under this section by a person other than the inventor, the patent shall be granted
to the real party in interest and upon such notice to the inventor as the Director
considers to be sufficient.
Id. (emphasis added). Whether a trade secret owner may claim to be such a person with a
“sufficient proprietary interest” would have to assume a variety of facts concerning the relationship
of the trade secret user to the inventor and is beyond the scope of this article. Id.
28 The issue was not in applying trade secret law to protect an invention during the few years
when the invention was being patented but had not yet been made public. See Delice Global, Inc. v.
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an inventor might invent something, use it commercially in the U.S. for a decade or
more,29 and then when the inventor perceives an increased risk that the secret may
become public (and hence become unprotectable under trade secret law), seek a
patent for the invention, adding another seventeen or twenty years (as the case may
be, depending on the statute) of federal protection for the subject matter.30 Many
have asked whether the AIA changed this. More specifically, the question is whether
a true inventor who has commercially used the invention for more than one year as a
trade secret can still receive a patent for it under the AIA. To simplify the inquiry,
assume that the trade secret use occurred inside the U.S.31
The AIA does not speak to this question expressly. No AIA provision says
explicitly that a trade secret in commercial use for over one year is patentable or not
patentable. To answer this question, one must analyze what the AIA does say. For
the benefit of non-patent specialists, a short introduction to the patent statutory
scheme follows.
An inventor begins the process of obtaining a patent by filing an application
with the U.S. PTO.32 The application must be for an invention that is among the
types of invention set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 101.33 The application must contain
a written description of the invention and must enable persons skilled in the relevant
art to make and use the invention.34 The application must contain “claims” that
particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter that the applicant
regards as the invention.35 The PTO is to reject claims that do not meet the statutory
requirements concerning “novelty”36 or nonobviousness.37 These two requirements
basically ensure that no one shall obtain a patent that withdraws from the public
domain subject matter that the public already has, i.e., subject matter that is not
“novel” or would have been obvious over what the public had as of the date of the
alleged invention. That is, the law seeks to ensure that the public is free to practice
what it already knows and whatever would have been “obvious” over what it already
knows. The PTO, acting through an “examiner” assigned to the application,
examines the application and searches for prior art to ensure compliance with the

Coco Int’l, Inc., No. Civ.A.09CV03541(DMC), 2009 WL 2905466, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009) (finding
“where the subject matter of a patent and that of a trade secret are substantially identical, the
issuance of the patent must be regarded as a disclosure of the trade secret”) (quoting Dollac Corp. v.
Margon Corp., 164 F. Supp. 41, 58 (D.N.J. 1958)).
29 See 35 U.S.C § 102(b) (2006). Use of a secret process outside the U.S., however, in some
circumstances would not trigger a bar under the pre-AIA statute. Id.
30 See 35 U.S.C § 154 (2012).
31 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (entitling a person to a patent unless the patent was in
public use or on sale in the United States, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent in the United States), with 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012) (entitling a person to a patent
without mention to whether the use occurred inside or outside of the United States).
32 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2012).
33 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 101.
34 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
35 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
36 35 U.S.C. § 102.
37 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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statute.38 The examiner and applicant go through an iterative process until claims
pass muster.
Most countries provide that an inventor forfeits patent protection unless he or
she files a patent application before disclosing the invention via sales, marketing,
etc.39 This is called “absolute novelty.” Instead of absolute novelty, the U.S. patent
law has provided inventors with a “grace period.” The grace period refers to a period
of time40 during which an inventor could test the market for the invention, determine
whether the market would justify the cost of obtaining a patent, and prepare a patent
application.41 Under the 1952 Act, publications, sales activity, or public uses of the
invention did not bar a patent application filed within twelve months after the first
such event.42 The “grace period” applied and allowed inventors twelve months to file
applications after disclosures, whether by others or by the inventor. The PTO
accordingly allowed inventors to overcome these otherwise invalidating disclosures
by attesting to prior invention, as the 1952 Act used a “first to invent” approach.43
The AIA replaced the first to invent approach with a “first inventor to file”
(“FITF”) approach.44 AIA Section 3 provides a substantially revised Section 102 that
contains a modified grace period.45 In an effort to move U.S. patent law closer to
international practice, the AIA not only redefines what constitutes “prior art” but
also essentially requires absolute novelty subject to a limited grace period.46 For new
(FITF) patents and patent applications governed by the AIA, prior art now generally
connotes any form of disclosure to the public before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention (the patent application date).47 Congress made a compromise
35 U.S.C. § 131.
See Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent Law, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 591, 609–10
(1994); Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 54, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199.
40 Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65 (1998) (citing 5 Stat. 353). Congress added a twoyear grace period to the patent statute in 1839. Id. In 1939, Congress reduced the grace period to
one year. Id. (citing 53 Stat. 1212). The 1952 Act continued the one-year grace period. Patent Act
of 1952, ch. 950, § 102, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended under Title 35 of the United States
Code). The AIA (2011) kept the one-year term but modified its applicability. AIA, Pub. L. No. 112–
29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
41 See Palmer v. Dudzik, 481 F.2d 1377, 1381–82 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Howmedica, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 846, 858 (D.N.J. 1981).
42 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 102, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended under Title 35 of
the United States Code).
43 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). The grace period applied to disclosures that were known or
unknown to the inventor at the time of filing. See id. As such, inventors frequently avoided delays
in filing their patent applications due to fear of unknown prior art under §102(b) that would come to
light at a later time. See id. If it was within twelve months of the earliest filing date, it could be
overcome via the grace provisions of the statute. See id. If the prior art was more than twelve
months prior, however, it was insuperable, and the inventor would have to distinguish over it to
obtain a patent, regardless of prior invention. See id.
44 See AIA, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
45 Id. § 3(b).
46 Id.
47 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). The new definition of prior art is as follows:
38
39

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—(1) the claimed invention was
patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise
available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or
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under which the one-year grace period applies to activities by or via the inventor (or
one of the coinventors), but otherwise the statute requires absolute novelty.48
Examination of the revised Section 102 shows that the statute does not say a
patent is barred if the invention had ever been used commercially.49 Thus, the
material question is whether the surreptitious commercial use destroys novelty
within the meaning of the patent statute.
At the outset, the problem can be cabined by consideration of the post-AIA
Section 102. First, the Section 102(b)(1) grace periods are irrelevant because the
question at hand presumes commercial use as a trade secret for an extended period,
and the grace period is limited to just one year.50 Under Section 102(b)(1), regardless
of who made the disclosure or under what conditions, if the prior art activity occurred
more than one year prior to the “effective filing date of the claimed invention” (as
specified in Section 102(a)(1)), then the (grace period) protections of Section 102(b)(1)
are inapplicable.51
Second, Section 102(a)(2) is irrelevant to this question. Section 102(a)(2)
concerns patent documents, and because patent documents are public, any trade
secret protection that may have existed before the publication or issuance of the
patent is lost because, by definition, a secret is not generally known, while the
contents of a publication are presumed to be generally known. Because Section
102(a)(2) is irrelevant, the exceptions to it stated in Section 102(b)(2) likewise are
(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in
an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in
which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and
was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Id.
48

35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The statute now states:
(1) Disclosures made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention—A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a
claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection
(a)(1) if—(A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by
another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the
inventor or a joint inventor; or (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such
disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another
who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor
or a joint inventor. (2) Disclosures appearing in applications and patents—A
disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under subsection (a)(2) if—
(A) the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly from the
inventor or a joint inventor; (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such
subject matter was effectively filed under subsection (a)(2), been publicly disclosed
by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter
disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (C) the
subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention, not later than the effective
filing date of the claimed invention, were owned by the same person or subject to
an obligation of assignment to the same person.

Id.
49
50
51

See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1).
35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1), (b)(1).
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irrelevant. Accordingly, three-fourths of Section 102 is inapplicable to the instant
issue.52
As to the remaining portion, Section 102(a)(1) specifies five acts that constitute
prior art: patenting, description in a printed publication, public use, on sale, or the
invention being “otherwise available to the public.”53 The first two of these acts are
inapplicable to the question of whether the trade secret user’s own actions raise a bar
to patentability, as the trade secret user would neither have already patented nor
published the subject matter of the trade secret. Hence, the issue devolves to
whether the claimed invention was “in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to
the public” within the meaning of Section 102(a)(1) (post-AIA) when it was used as a
trade secret for an extended time.
A. The PTO Position
From an examination of statements by the PTO, it appears that persons who
practiced trade secrets, even if the practice was commercial, would not be barred
automatically from patenting by Section 102 (post-AIA).54 The PTO has commented
fairly extensively about its understanding of the AIA and how the PTO will apply it.
With regard to the question of what constitutes prior art, the PTO has repeatedly
explained that public knowledge of the invention is the key to prior art. For example:
As discussed previously, public use under AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) is
limited to those uses that are available to the public. The public use
provision of AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) thus has the same substantive scope,
with respect to uses by either the inventor or a third party, as public uses
under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) by unrelated third parties or uses by
others under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).55
102(a) was drafted in part to do away with precedent under current law
that private offers for sale or private uses or secret processes practiced in
the United States that result in a product or service that is then made
public may be deemed patent-defeating prior art. That will no longer be the
case. In effect, the new paragraph 102(a)(1) imposes an overarching
requirement for availability to the public, that is a public disclosure, which
52 One can advantageously view the new § 102 as a 2 x 2 matrix placing the 102(a)(1) bars at
the top left, with the § 102(b)(1) exceptions at the top right so they are beside the bars they address.
Likewise, the bottom left quadrant has the § 102(a)(2) bars and the § 102(b)(2) exceptions are
located at the right. Viewed this way, only the top left quadrant is relevant to the instant question.
53 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
54 Of course, this does not apply to subject matter that is disclosed by a publicly sold product
itself. It is difficult to demonstrate a trade secret that is revealed in a product that is publicly sold.
One possible exception to consider would be a product that has unique characteristics arising from a
production technique, where the invention is not only the process for manufacturing but also a
product made using what such a process. The patent bar calls these “product-by-process” claims.
55 Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First Inventor To File Provisions of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,059, 11,075 (Feb. 14, 2013).
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will limit paragraph 102(a)(1) prior art to subject matter meeting the public
accessibility standard that is well-settled in current law, especially case law
of the Federal Circuit.56
[C]ontrary to current precedent, in order to trigger the bar in the new
102(a) in our legislation, an action must make the patented subject matter
“available to the public” before the effective filing date.57
Based on the foregoing statements, the PTO considers that subject matter that has
been practiced secretly (as a trade secret) or sold secretly is not prior art because it
was not “available to the public,” i.e., did not make the subject matter accessible to
the public. Therefore, it is probable that the PTO will grant patents to inventors of
such non-public subject matter despite it having been used previously in a nonpublic, commercial manner.
B. Congressional Intent
The 2011 House Report for the bill contains the following statement of intent or
understanding:
[t]hus, in section 102 . . . the phrase “available to the public” is added to
clarify the broad scope of relevant prior art, as well as to emphasize the fact
that it must be publicly accessible.58
In addition, the Congressional Record speaks to the issue as well:
[t]he words “otherwise available to the public” were added to section
102(a)(1) during that Congress’s Judiciary Committee mark up of the bill.
The word “otherwise” makes clear that the preceding clauses describe
things that are of the same quality or nature as the final clause—that is,
although different categories of prior art are listed, all of them are limited
to that which makes the invention “available to the public.” As the
committee report notes at page 9, “the phrase ‘available to the public’ is
added to clarify the broad scope of relevant prior art, as well as to
emphasize the fact that it [i.e., the relevant prior art] must be publicly
available.” In other words, as the report notes, “[p]rior art will be measured
from the filing date of the application and will include all art that publicly

56
57
58

Id. at 11,084 n.8 (quoting 157 Cong. Rec. S1496 (Mar. 9, 2011)) (emphasis added).
Id. (citing 157 Cong. Rec. H4429 (June 22, 2011)).
H.R. REP. NO. 112–98, pt. 1 at 42–43 (2011).
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exists prior to the filing date, other than disclosures by the inventor within
one year of filing.”59
C. Whether Courts Will Consider Such a Patent Valid
When an inventor seeks to enforce a patent that issued on an application filed
only after long commercial, but secret, use of the patented subject matter, the alleged
infringer will inevitably challenge validity, and courts will have to interpret how the
revised Section 102 bears on that issue.60 The statements of the PTO on what it
thinks the statute means are not precedent that any Art. III court is bound to
follow.61 As for the legislative history, the judicial interpretation of statutes begins
with the statutory text,62 and where such “text is plain, there is no need to proceed
any further [and look to legislative history].”63 Jurists hold differing views on the
value of legislative history in statutory interpretation, and the Supreme Court does
not have a unanimous view on that topic. For example, opposing views are evident in
the majority and concurring opinions from Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier:
Justice White (majority opinion): “As for the propriety of using legislative
history at all, common sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing
additional information rather than ignoring it . . . [T]he Court's practice of
utilizing legislative history reaches well into its past.”64
Justice Scalia (concurring): “As late as 1897, we stated quite clearly that
there is ‘a general acquiescence in the doctrine that debates in Congress are
not appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning
of the language of a statute passed by that body.’”65

59 157 CONG. REC. S1360, at S1370 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (citing S. REP. NO. 110–259, at 9
(2008)), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2011-03-08/pdf/CREC-2011-03-08-pt1PgS1360-2.pdf.
60 See Richard A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for
Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 53–55 (Winter 2012).
61 R. Carl Moy, Judicial Deference to the PTO’s Interpretations of the Patent Law, 74 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 406, 407 (citing In re Gibbs, 437 F.2d 486, 491 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
62 See, e.g., Miss. ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 741 (2014) (citing Sebelius
v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1892–93 (2013)).
63 Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1181 (2013).
64 Wis. Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991). See also Hardt v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 257 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring-in-part) (stating, about an
earlier ruling, “[t]he outcome in that closely divided case turned, to a significant extent, on a
judgment about how to read the legislative history of the provision in question”).
65 Wis. Public Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing U.S. v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897)). See also U.S. v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557, 567 n.5 (2013)
(“Whether or not legislative history is ever relevant, it need not be consulted when, as here, the
statutory text is unambiguous.”) (citing Mohammed v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1709
(2012)).

[13:497 2014] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

510

Beyond the question of whether the courts will apply the legislative history,66 a
second issue concerns judicial precedents and whether Congress has overruled them
legislatively. While various remarks from the legislative history suggest clearly that
Congress intended to overrule precedents, a brief review of some leading case law is
necessary because, e.g., Congress is not free to overrule the Constitution, and if
precedents base their holdings on the Constitution, more than legislative
commentary is needed to overturn it.67 The precedents might be applicable for other
reasons also. Some of the leading pertinent cases are now considered.
1. Pennock v. Dialogue
Pennock v. Dialogue involved a process invention, and the Supreme Court ruled
the patent invalid due to prior commercial use.68 The invention claimed in the patent
resided in the manner of making a hose so that the parts of it that were joined
together would be tight.69 Before patenting, 13,000 feet of hose had been constructed
per the invented process and sold in the U.S.70 The Supreme Court affirmed
judgment for the defendant on the bases that: (1) an inventor cannot resurrect a
once-abandoned right to patent, (2) the Constitution confines patent rights to
“limited times,” and (3) the primary purpose of the patent system is to promote
progress.71 It would materially retard progress if an inventor could hold back
knowledge of an invention for a long period, profit from it, and only later seek
exclusive rights:
We think, then, the true meaning must be, not known or used by the public,
before the application. And, thus construed, there is much reason for the
limitation thus imposed by the act. While one great object was, by holding
out a reasonable reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right to
their inventions for a limited period, to stimulate the efforts of genius; the
main object was “to promote the progress of science and useful arts;” and
this could be done best, by giving the public at large a right to make,
construct, use, and vend the thing invented, at as early a period as possible;
having a due regard to the rights of the inventor. If an inventor should be
permitted to hold back from the knowledge of the public the secrets of his
invention; if he should for a long period of years retain the monopoly, and
make, and sell his invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits of
66 A further issue in the case of the AIA is that some of the legislative “history” was added to
the Congressional Record after Congress had already voted on and approved the bill. One may
question how legislators casting their votes could have relied on comments yet to be made. See, e.g.,
Woods, 134 S. Ct. at 568 (noting that items written after passage of legislation “d[o] not inform the
decisions of the members of Congress who vot[e] in favor of the [law]”).
67 See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21
FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 478 n.280 (2012).
68 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1829).
69 Id. at 3.
70 Id. at 9.
71 Id. at 19.
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it, relying upon his superior skill and knowledge of the structure; and then,
and then only, when the danger of competition should force him to secure
the exclusive right, he should be allowed to take out a patent, and thus
exclude the public from any farther [sic] use than what should be derived
under it during his fourteen years; it would materially retard the progress of
science and the useful arts, and give a premium to those who should be least
prompt to communicate their discoveries.72
Justice Story thus based this passage on the “main object” for patents expressed in
the Constitution—to promote the progress of science and useful arts. The Court
concluded:
It is admitted that the subject is not wholly free from difficulties; but upon
most deliberate consideration we are all of opinion, that the true
construction of the act is, that the first inventor cannot acquire a good title
to a patent; if he suffers the thing invented to go into public use, or to be
publicly sold for use, before he makes application for a patent. His
voluntary act or acquiescence in the public sale and use is an abandonment
of his right; or rather creates a disability to comply with the terms and
conditions on which alone the secretary of state is authorized to grant him a
patent.73
Thus the Court construed the patent statute to achieve the constitutional
purpose and ruled that the inventor had abandoned the right to a patent by public
sales of a product that did not reveal the manufacturing method.74
2. Egbert v. Lippmann
In the famous corset stays case, Egbert v. Lippmann, the Supreme Court ruled
the patent invalid, though this was a patent for a product rather than a secret
manufacturing process.75 The inventor, Mr. Barnes, had improved some corset stays
and gave them to the future Mrs. Barnes.76 She wore them for “a long time.”77 He
made another pair in 1858, which she also wore for a long time.78 When the corsets
wore out, she ripped them open and reused the stays in new corsets, doing this
several times.79 The Court stressed that this was a public use and that Barnes had

Id. (emphases added).
Id. at 23–24.
74 Id. at 24. One should also note that in the AIA, Congress removed the provision of 35 U.S.C.
§102(c) that “he has abandoned the invention.” One issue is whether courts will distinguish between
abandoning the “invention” and abandoning the right to patent the invention.
75 Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337–38 (1881).
76 Id. at 335.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
72
73
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slept on his rights.80 The Court noted that a single item suffices for public use; a use
is “public use” if an inventor gives or sells a device to another to be used by that
person without limiting secrecy; Barnes imposed no obligation of secrecy; and his use
was not to experiment or to test the qualities of his product.81 Instead, the invention
was complete. Barnes slept on his rights for eleven years, and before he applied for a
patent, his invention was widely used in making corset stays. Consequently, the
Court declared, Barnes had dedicated the invention to the public and could not
obtain a patent on it.
3. Woodbridge v. United States
The Supreme Court in Woodbridge v. United States held that the patent right
had been forfeited by delay.82 In 1852, Woodbridge filed a patent application for
projectiles shot from cannon.83 That same year, the Patent Office allowed his
claims.84 However, later that year, Woodbridge requested placing his application file
in the Patent Office’s secret archives for one year to permit foreign filing.85 This was
permitted by the then-current patent statute.86 In 1861, Woodbridge wrote to the
Patent Office to explain that he had thus far had no chance for remuneration from
his invention until lately, and he requested issuance of the patent.87 In that same
1861 letter, Woodbridge asked to broaden the specification and claims.88 In 1862, the
Patent Office ruled that Woodbridge’s slumber of ten years was a bar to issuance of a
patent.89 The Patent Office noted that Woodbridge had kept the invention from the
public and patent examiners and that others had now invented and patented it.90
The Patent Office thus rejected the application, based on abandonment.91
Woodbridge was involved through 1880 in appeals.
Twenty years later, in 1901, a special Act of Congress for Woodbridge’s benefit
conferred jurisdiction at the U.S. Court of Claims.92 After another nearly twenty
years, in 1920, that court ruled that Woodbridge was the first inventor, that the U.S.
did not use the invention, and that Woodbridge had forfeited or abandoned the
invention.93 The case then went to the Supreme Court.94

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id. at 337.
Id.
Woodbridge v. U.S., 263 U.S. 50, 63 (1923).
Id. at 51–52.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Woodbridge v. U.S., 55 Ct. Cl. 234, 268, 269 (1920).
Woodbridge v. U.S., 263 U.S. 50, 51 (1923).
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In 1923, the Supreme Court affirmed the forfeiture ruling.95 It referred to the
purpose stated in the constitutional clause allowing for patents, namely, to promote
progress of science and useful arts.96 Congress relies on the public benefit; it will
“buy” the invention during the patent term, and (the public) will use it freely
thereafter.97
Any practice by the inventor and applicant for a patent through which he
deliberately and without excuse postpones beyond the date of the actual
invention, the beginning of the term of his monopoly, and thus puts off the
free public enjoyment of the useful invention, is an evasion of the statute
and defeats its benevolent aim.98
Here, Woodbridge’s delay was for the admitted purpose of optimizing profits.99 This
was a case of forfeiture by “designed delay.”100 Woodbridge “deprived the public of a
decade of free use of the patent which the law intended.”101 The Supreme Court cited
a Sixth Circuit case where the inventor had kept a glass-making invention a trade
secret for about ten years, then sought a patent.102 The Sixth Circuit cited the policy
that patent laws secure to the public the full benefit of the invention after a fixed
term deemed sufficient to stimulate invention.103 That policy would be defeated if an
inventor could rely on trade secrets and later opt for patent rights.104 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court ruled that Woodbridge had forfeited his patent right by delay from
1852 to 1862.105
4. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.
Turning to lower court cases, W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc. is
seminal.106 This case involved a process for rapidly stretching Teflon®.107 A third
party (Cropper) had earlier constructed a machine in New Zealand performing such a
process and sold the machine to Budd to practice this process in the U.S.108 Cropper
had included a provision in the sales agreement with Budd to protect the secrecy of
the machine.109 Moreover, the operation of the machine did not reveal the process.110

Id. at 63.
Id. at 55.
97 Id. at 55.
98 Id. at 56.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 58.
102 Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 246 F. 695, 698 (6th Cir. 1917).
103 Id. at 700.
104 Id. at 703.
105 Woodridge v. U.S., 263 U.S. 50, 63 (1923).
106 W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
107 Id. at 1545.
108 Id. at 1549.
109 Id.
95
96
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The district court nevertheless invalidated Gore’s patent under pre-AIA Section
102(b), concluding that the invention had been on sale and in public use in the U.S.
more than one year before the filing date by Gore.111 The Federal Circuit reversed.112
Budd had sold only tape produced on the machine.113 There was no evidence that the
process invention could be learned from examining the tape.114 The court explained
that the law favors a second inventor (Gore) who promptly seeks a patent (because
the public will gain disclosure of the process) over a first inventor who made product
sales and suppressed or concealed the process from the public.115 Importantly, Budd
and Cropper could be barred from patenting the invention.116 The Court explained as
follows:
If Budd and Cropper commercialized the tape, that could result in a
forfeiture of a patent granted them for their process on an application filed
by them more than a year later There is no reason or statutory basis,
however, on which Budd’s and Cropper’s secret commercialization of a
process, if established, could be held a bar to the grant of a patent to Gore
on that process.
Early public disclosure is a linchpin of the patent system. As between a
prior inventor who benefits from a process by selling its product but
suppresses, conceals, or otherwise keeps the process from the public, and a
later inventor who promptly files a patent application from which the public
will gain a disclosure of the process, the law favors the latter. The district
court therefore erred as a matter of law in applying the statute and in its
determination that Budd’s secret use of the Cropper machine and sale of
tape rendered all process claims of the ‘566 patent invalid under § 102(b).117
Thus, prior secret uses in the U.S. did not bar the second inventor but would bar the
first inventor. W.L. Gore continues to be cited by the Federal Circuit.118
5. Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co.
In Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., the inventor
who assigned to Metallizing had used the invented method for over one year before
the filing date of the patent application.119 The district court ruled that the patent
110 Id. (“There is no evidence that Budd’s secret use of the Cropper machine made knowledge of
the claimed process accessible to the public.”).
111 Id. at 1546.
112 Id. at 1559.
113 Id. at 1550.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. (internal citations omitted).
118 See, e.g., Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharm., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
119 Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946).
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was valid and infringed.120 The Second Circuit reversed and dismissed the complaint
on the basis that the prior use was commercial, and the inventor had forfeited the
right to a patent.121 He was (impermissibly) extending the period of monopoly.122
6. Judicial Review of the AIA’s Change as to the Status of Trade Secrets as Prior Art
In due course, a patent will be litigated where the inventor or his assignee
enjoyed years of non-experimental, commercial use of an invention as a trade secret
before filing a patent application under the FITF regime established by the AIA.123
The patent is likely to be challenged on either or both of (at least) two grounds. One
ground is whether the revision by the AIA to the patent statute with respect to what
constitutes prior art is a constitutional exercise of legislative power. The Supreme
Court previously said that granting a patent to an inventor who had delayed the
application for commercial reasons (beyond the grace period) would retard the
progress of the useful arts.124
As such, one may ask whether the AIA is
constitutionally infirm if it allows such patents to be granted by the PTO.125
The other ground would be whether the patent is invalid for delay, forfeiture, or
abandonment of the patent right or the invention, independent of the Constitution.
Courts will need to consider the effect of the AIA in removing 35 U.S.C. Section
102(c) (abandoned the invention) (pre-AIA). A question the courts will have to
confront is whether the abandonment or forfeiture doctrines are nevertheless still
available to protect the public interest against such patents.
The law on Section 102(c) abandonment is not robust. Moy’s Walker on Patents
calls it “the most curious provision” in Section 102 and explains that the question of
whether the invention is unpatentable because it has been abandoned “has receded
drastically over the course of the 20th Century, to the point where today it has
almost no impact at all.”126 Moy’s Walker draws an analogy to the abandonment of
property, where the owner ceases to exercise dominion over the property with the
intent not to resume.127 Applying that to the patent context, the treatise explains,
abandonment occurs when the inventor forms an intent to forgo patent rights in the
invention and couples such an intent with action that will make loss of dominion over
the invention likely.128 As relevant here, the “inventor” of the trade secret might be
argued to have formed an intent to forgo patent protection by using trade secret
Id. at 517.
Id. at 520.
122 Id.
123 The AIA makes the new prior art provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 102 applicable to new patent
applications that are filed after March 15, 2013 without asserting priority to a date earlier than that
date. AIA, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 3(n), 125 Stat. 284 (2011); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
124 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829).
125 Ariz. v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2269 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). If a constitutional infirmity may
exist in an Act of Congress, the Supreme Court “will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” Id.
126 2 MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS, § 8:267 (4th ed. 2013).
127 Id. § 8:271.
128 Id.
120
121
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mechanisms and allowing time to pass without taking any steps to patent the
invention.129
On the other hand, the AIA removed the pre-AIA Section 102(c) on abandonment
from the statute.130 Similarly, in abrogating interferences, the AIA did away with
the “abandoned, suppressed, or concealed” provisions of Section 102(g).131 Courts
might interpret that deletion as signaling Congress’ intent that inventions and
discoveries are patent-worthy even if they had been the subject of abandonment, so
long as they pass muster under the remaining provisions of the post-AIA patent
statute.
For the past two centuries, “[e]arly public disclosure [has been] a linchpin of the
patent system,” adapting the language of the Gore court.132 Future courts will need
to decide whether that linchpin is a necessary part of the new patent system.
Considering the move toward absolute novelty and limiting the applicability of the
one-year grace period, courts may conclude that early public disclosure is still a
critical underpinning of the patent system. As such, courts will question how that
goal is furthered when the inventor precedes the patent term with an indefinite
period (longer than one year) of trade secret protection.
Of course, courts could determine that Congress intended this very result—that
inventors may indeed take advantage of state and federal protections of inventions
sequentially. Courts would then need to decide whether this new construct is
constitutional. The ultimate question is whether the redefinition of prior art in
Section 102 promotes or retards the progress of the useful arts when (and if) it allows
patents to issue on filings delayed by an indeterminate period of trade secret
protection. Courts will ask whether the benefit of introducing technical knowledge to
the public, even if delayed, outweighs the harm caused by the delay. Patent
doctrines have developed to control delaying tactics of inventors who deliberately
prolong the prosecution by filing sequential divisional, continuation, and
continuation-in-part patent applications.133 Additionally, courts will ask whether a
patent statute that allows inventors to use trade secret protection prior to using the
patent system will still promote the encouragement of invention. In Kewanee, the

129 Cf. Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 653–54 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (holding that an invention had
been abandoned under § 102(g) by virtue of over four years passing after actual reduction to practice
before the company patent group filed a patent application for it). The Court saw that as
unreasonable delay, and declared that specific intent to abandon is unnecessary when the delay is so
long as to raise an inference of intent to suppress. Id. at 654.
130 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (2006) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (c) he
has abandoned the invention”), with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (eliminating previous abandonment
language).
131 Compare
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless . . . (g) . . . (2) before such person’s invention thereof, the invention was made in this country
by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it”), with 35 U.S.C. § 102
(2012) (eliminating previous provisions).
132 W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
133 While courts developed case law restraining “prosecution laches,” Congress also took steps
to avoid indefinite prolongation of the patent term by keying the patent term is keyed to the
application filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). But when the application filing date itself is
delayed, § 154 offers no solace to the public. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(A) (2012).
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Court concluded that both the trade secret laws and the patent laws encourage
invention but it was not considering sequential use of the two forms of protection.134
Given the strong aversion of courts against delay tactics that postpone the
beginning of a patent term to increase the inventor’s period of exclusive use of the
subject matter,135 courts might insist on a very clear expression from Congress that it
intended that very result. That is, courts might seek strong evidence that Congress
intended to permit such delay, along with an increased reward to the delaying
inventor, in order to receive the public disclosure contained within the patent, albeit
a delayed disclosure.136 Moreover, even if such an expression from Congress exists,
courts could also decide that this result fails to promote the progress of science and
the useful arts, and thus is unconstitutional.
IV. WHETHER A THIRD PARTY’S TRADE SECRET USE CREATES A DEFENSE
This section avoids the concern in Section III that the innovator himself used the
invention as a trade secret for an extended time. In this scenario, there is no delay
by the patent applicant. Instead, this section assumes that a third party has used
the invention in secret for several years. The question is whether the invention is
nevertheless patentable to the new inventor in light of that use.
The 1983 Federal Circuit ruling in W.L. Gore answers most of this question. The
court indicated that a first inventor (Cropper) who used the invention commercially
in secret would be barred from U.S. patent protection.137 However, the court
sustained the patent of the second inventor (Gore) despite the secret commercial use
by a third party (Budd) who was in privity with the first inventor (Cropper).138
The question is whether Congress legislatively overruled Gore in the AIA. In
the AIA, Congress changed the patent statute to bar patents where the claimed
invention was in “public” use (anywhere in the world) and in such manner as to be
“available to the public.139 A mere “prior use” without facts showing public
availability should not raise a Section 102(a) bar (post-AIA).140 If the prior use was
134 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (“The maintenance of standards
of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade
secret law.”) (emphasis added).
135 The inventor presumably enjoyed exclusive use of the subject matter while it was
maintained as a trade secret. See Timothy R. DeWitt, Does Supreme Court Precedent Sink
Submarine Patents?, 38 IDEA 601, 602 (1998) (noting a district court ruling reminiscing earlier
Supreme Court decisions against patent application delays).
136 That the reward would be increased is a reasonable assumption, in that technology usually
builds upon itself. While there are exceptions where delayed patents are worth less than they would
have been had they issued earlier—as when the invention addresses technology that becomes
superseded, these are believed to be exceptions rather than the rule. If the delay tends to increase
the reward, one may question whether giving an increased reward in the form of a postponed patent
can be justified by the public receiving a delayed disclosure.
137 W.L. Gore, 721 F.2d at 1550.
138 Id. This shows that under the U.S. patent system, a valid patent can be issued to a person
who is second to invent. Id.
139 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
140 Id.
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insufficient under the pre-AIA statute, as Gore indicates, it should be even more
insufficient under the AIA revision that affirmatively recites public disclosure as the
key.141 The Federal Circuit is likely to apply the reasoning of Gore to sustain a
second inventor’s patent despite prior invention by another who used it commercially
but in secret.142
The Supreme Court position is harder to predict. No forfeiture by this patent
applicant is applicable, nor any abandonment.
Thus, Pennock, Egbert, and
Woodbridge are distinguishable.143 If the Court were to find that the prior trade
secret use made the claimed invention “available to the public,” then the patent
would not be novel under Section 102(a)(1).144
V. TRADE SECRETS AND THE PRIOR USER DEFENSE
The fourth inquiry addresses the situation where an entity is not seeking patent
rights, is using a method or machine in commercial processes, and is challenged by a
second comer who obtained a patent covering the method or machine. Here, the
entity is not citing a third party’s prior, trade secret use to invalidate the second
comer’s patent but instead wants to rely on its own secret, prior use as a defense.145
This question should be highly interesting to businesses that develop or acquire and
use technology that may be patented later by a third party who asserts it against the
business.
This situation brings up the prior user defense provided in 35 U.S.C. § 273 as
expanded by the AIA § 5.146 This defense is no longer confined to business method
patents but now includes processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions used in
manufacturing or other commercial processes.147 The Section 273 defense is a
limitation on what constitutes infringement, not what constitutes a valid patent.148
Under the broadened Section 273(a):
A person shall be entitled to a defense under section 282(b) . . . with respect
to subject matter consisting of a process, or consisting of a machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter used in a manufacturing or other
141 Id.; Letter from Joseph M. Potenzam, Section Chair, Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Intellectual
Prop. Law, to David Kappos, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. & Dir. of the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office 4 (Oct. 1, 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/
comments/aba-ipl_20121001.pdf.
142 See, e.g., Dey L.P. v. Sunovion Pharm., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
TorPharm Inc. v. Ranbaxy Pharm., Inc., 336 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
143 See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1829) (finding abandonment of the right to
patent); Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337–38 (1881) (finding abandonment through the
conduct of the inventor); Woodbridge v. U.S., 263 U.S. 50, 56–57 (1923) (stating that the right to
patent may be forfeited).
144 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
145 35 U.S.C. § 273(a).
146 Id. See AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 5, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
147 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2006).
148 35 U.S.C. § 273(g) (2012) (“A patent shall not be deemed to be invalid under section 102 or
103 . . . solely because a defense is raised or established under this section.”).
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commercial process, that would otherwise infringe a claimed invention
being asserted against the person if . . . .149
A. History & Background of the Prior User Defense
As noted in Section II, a prior user defense had been part of the 1839 Patent
Act.150 After being revised over the years, it was not included in the 1952 Patent
Act.151 However, it received new life in a Congressional response to State Street Bank
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, a case that involved a financial patent
concerning mutual funds.152 The patent claims at issue there were written in
“means-plus-function” format,153 and the district court ruled them nonstatutory, i.e.,
improper subject matter for patenting.154 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that
the “transformation of data representing discrete dollar amounts, by a
machine . . . constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm because
it produces ‘a useful, concrete and tangible result’ [and satisfies Section 101].”155
Congress responded with the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (“AIPA”),156
which provided in a new 35 U.S.C. § 273 that it is not patent infringement for a prior
user to continue to use certain subject matter even if a third party later obtains
patent protection covering it, if certain conditions are met.157 Those conditions relate
to the date of the patent, the date of the activity relative to the patent application
filing date, the nature of the use, its duration, and other factors.158
B. Requirements for the Revised Prior User Defense
Under the AIPA (1999), this defense was restricted to business method patents
only.159 However, under the AIA, the defense covers patents on methods, machines,
manufactures, or compositions used in manufacturing or other commercial
processes.160

35 U.S.C. § 273(a).
Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353 (1839).
151 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, tbl. 2, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended under Title 35 of
the United States Code).
152 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Jeff
Mirkut, How the America Invents Act Revived the Prior-User Defense, ABA INTELL. PROP. LITIG.
COMM. (Feb. 20, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/intellectual/articles/
winter2012-prior-user-defense-america-invents-act.html.
153 State St., 149 F.3d at 1371 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶6, now § 112(f)).
154 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 927 F. Supp. 502, 517 (D. Mass. 1996).
155 State St., 149 F.3d at 1373.
156 American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 273, 113 Stat. 1501
(invalidated 2011).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012).
149
150
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This expanded defense is prospective only. AIA Section 5(c) states: “[t]he
amendments made by this section shall apply to any patent issued on or after the
date of the enactment of this Act.”161 Accordingly, if the patent at issue issued on or
after September 16, 2011, then the new provisions of the AIA apply, but otherwise
the narrower provisions of Section 273 (pre-AIA) apply.162
Under revised Section 273, two important dates to establishing the defense are
the effective filing date of the asserted patent and the date of any pre-filing
disclosure by the inventor (under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).163 The defense requires use
that endures at least one year and which begins before the effective filing date of the
patent sought to be enforced, or, if there was a pre-filing disclosure, then at least one
year before the date on which the claimed invention was disclosed to the public in a
manner that qualifies for the exception from prior art under Section 102(b).164 To
support the broadened prior user defense, the prior use must precede both of the two
dates, the effective filing date and any public disclosure, by at least one year.165
The AIA allows five kinds of use to establish the defense.166 These are (1) “an
internal commercial use,” (2) “an actual arm’s length sale,” or (3) an “arm’s length
commercial transfer of a useful end result of such commercial use.”167 In addition, (4)
premarket regulatory review is another kind of qualifying use provided the review is
for safety or efficacy of the subject matter, and (5) use in a nonprofit research
laboratory or other nonprofit entity also is treated as commercial use for purposes of
establishing the defense.168 The AIA abandons the AIPA requirement that the use
for which the public is the intended beneficiary “may not be asserted as a defense
with respect to any subsequent commercialization or use outside such laboratory or
nonprofit entity.”169
Under the AIA, the prior use must be “in the United States.”170 The AIA does
not credit uses in foreign countries, even if they arise in countries party to WTO,
NAFTA, or other international agreements.171 In this way, the AIA promotes
domestic industry.
The updated defense has site restrictions, and this provision refers to still other
dates.172 After an acquisition of a line of business or enterprise, the acquiring entity
may assert this defense only at sites where the accused subject matter was in use
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention or before the date of the
See AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 5(c), 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
35 U.S.C. § 273(c).
163 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(2).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 273(a)(1), (c)(2).
167 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(1).
168 35 U.S.C. § 273(c)(2) (2012).
169 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(2)(B) (2006) (stating that nonprofit research constitutes
commercial use when “the public is the intended beneficiary” and the use extends beyond the
laboratory or non-profit entity), with 35 U.S.C. § 273(c)(2) (2012) (stating that nonprofit research
constitutes commercial use when “the public is the intended beneficiary” and “noncommercial use
by and in the laboratory or other nonprofit entity”).
170 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(1).
171 Id.
172 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(1)(C).
161
162
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assignment or transfer, whichever is later.173 If the adverse patent application
already has an effective filing date, the AIA as written does not contemplate a
manufacturer acquiring an entity or line of business where the prior user defense
had been established and then expanding that use to new sites and asserting the
defense with respect to the new sites.174 Moreover, the statute requires a good faith
assignment or transfer of the entire enterprise or line of business to which the
defense relates.175
The AIA included a “limitations and exceptions” part of Section 273 that denies
the defense with respect to “university patents” in most circumstances.176 The
intricacies of this topic are beyond the present overview of the defense.177
Another requirement is that the prior user who asserts the defense must be
acting in good faith.178 For example, the prior user can purchase the subject matter
from a third party in good faith, and the use thereof would not be disqualified.
However, the prior use defense cannot be asserted if the subject matter on which the
defense is based was derived from the patentee or persons in privity with the
patentee.179
Proof of prior use must be established by clear and convincing evidence.180 The
defense is personal and cannot be licensed.181 Persons covered by the defense include
the “entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with such
person” “who performed or directed the performance of the commercial use . . . .”182
Importantly, to establish the prior user defense, an accused infringer has no
burden to prove that it “invented” anything—it must merely show the prescribed use
at the prescribed times at the prescribed places, in good faith, without derivation.183
Further, the alleged infringer bears no burden to show that the use was a trade
secret use. That is immaterial to the defense.184
Congress took steps to prevent the prior user defense from being asserted
recklessly or routinely and provided that a court must find a case exceptional for the
purpose of awarding attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 if the defense is pleaded by
a person who both is found to infringe, and fails to demonstrate a reasonable basis

Id.
See 35 U.S.C. § 273.
175 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(1)(B).
176 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5).
177 In brief, no prior user defense applies if the claimed invention was owned or subject to an
obligation of assignment to either a university (as defined) or a technology transfer organization
having the purpose of facilitating the commercialization of technologies developed by such
universities. This exclusion also takes into consideration when the invention was made. 35 U.S.C.
§ 273(e)(5)(A) (2012). Not all university patents are immune under the AIA revised defense.
178 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(1).
179 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(2).
180 35 U.S.C. § 273(b).
181 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(1)(A).
182 Id.
183 35 U.S.C. §§ 273(a), (e)(2).
184 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 273 (providing background to support a lack of burden to show the
type of use).
173
174
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for asserting this defense.185 Naturally, under Section 285 the court still “may”
award attorney fees in its discretion, or may not.186
VI. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Based on the foregoing discussions, the AIA does not abrogate trade secret law
in any respect. The PTO likely will issue patents to inventors even if they have
commercially practiced their inventions in secret, provided that the use did not make
the invention publicly available for more than the one-year grace period. It is
unclear whether the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit will sustain patents to
such inventors-prior users. In addition, if the Federal Circuit adheres to the
reasoning set forth by Chief Judge Markey in Gore v. Garlock, then it is unlikely to
invalidate a patent issued to a second inventor over a prior (secret) commercial use
by another that does not inform the public of the invention, per the policy favoring
placing inventions into the public knowledge.187
If a prior use by the innovator or a third party does inform the public of the
invention and it occurred outside the grace period, the patent is invalid under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) (post-AIA).188 Apart from a validity defense, one’s own prior,
commercial use of a process or other technology, whether secret or not, can provide
an infringement defense (leaving the patent owner free to assert the patent against
others, but not the statutorily-qualified prior user), subject to several restrictions set
forth in Section 273.189 To benefit from Section 273, one does not need to be first to
invent, does not need to be an inventor at all, and does not need to prove trade secret
status of the relevant technology.190
The relationship of patent law to trade secret law impacts how one decides to
protect one’s innovations, and the changes wrought by the AIA should be weighed.
One obvious practical implication is that if an innovation would not survive scrutiny
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (and hence not merit a patent), then the innovator may
want to employ trade secret protection where the standard for protection is much
different.191 On the other hand, if the secret technology is likely to become public and
trade secret protection is in jeopardy, then if the innovator has a bona fide argument
for patentability, it might apply for patent and try to prove patentability.
A second implication concerns weighing the risks regarding patenting. These
are changed in two ways. First, the AIA raises the risks in delaying the filing of a
patent application and instead relying on trade secret protection.192 Under the
revised novelty standard for patentability (35 U.S.C. § 102, post-AIA), the statute
35 U.S.C. § 273(f).
35 U.S.C. § 285.
187 See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
188 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (amended 2012) (stating a disclosure inside the grace period that informs
the public is not prior art).
189 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012).
190 See id.
191 2-9 ROGER MILGRIM & ERIC BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 9.02 (2013) [hereinafter
MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS].
192 See supra Section III.
185
186

[13:497 2014]

The Impact of The America Invents Act
on Trade Secrets

523

calls for almost absolute novelty as to third party activities.193 Previously, the grace
period allowed the inventor twelve months from specified activities of himself or
others.194 Now the grace period will not apply to activities of others who create prior
art.195 Hence, the AIA increases the risks related to the time of filing.
Compounding that, for patents issued under the new FITF regime of the AIA,
prior art may arise anywhere in the world. Thus, the AIA increases the potential
risks to patent applicants by removing the prior geographical limitations of
potentially invalidating prior art. Previously, while patents and printed publications
anywhere in the world were prior art, sales and uses had to occur in the U.S. to be
counted as “prior art.”196 Now there is no geographic restriction as to the five types of
Section 102(a) prior art (patented, printed publication, public use, on sale, or
otherwise available to the public).197 To overcome third party activities, innovators
cannot rely on prior invention. They have to prove derivation or a public disclosure
of their own, prior to the public disclosure of the third party.
At the same time, the AIA lowers some risks. Under the AIA (and subject to
judicial confirmation), a prior, non-disclosing (i.e., secret) use should not defeat one’s
patent under the new AIA regime because such use is not prior art under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102.198 Paradoxically, it may be the case that the prior non-public uses, if provable,
will support arguments for commercial success or other secondary factors bearing on
patentability.
A third implication is that there is no palpable risk that the AIA revisions to
patent law preempt trade secret law. Innovators should weigh the benefits of trade
secret protection versus patent protection and decide whether they can accept the
risk of a third party making a public disclosure that destroys both the trade secret
status and the innovator’s right to a patent. The innovator will not be able to
overcome such a disclosure except by showing derivation or the innovator’s own
earlier public disclosure.199 The latter route, however, flies in the face of trade secret
law’s requirement for reasonable safeguards against public disclosures of the
secret.200
Fourth, if an innovator decides to rely on trade secret protection rather than
patent protection, the Section 273 defense is available against future charges of
patent infringement.201 Whether the defense can be established is heavily fact
dependent. An advantage of trade secret protection over patent protection is that
trade secret protection can be indefinite in term—it has no expiration date.202 Trade
193 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2133.05(a)(II)(C) (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) [hereinafter MPEP]; Daniel N. Christus
et al., Intellectual Property in the Americas, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1095, 1108 (1998).
194 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
195 MPEP, supra note 193, § 2133.
196 4 JIM LONGACRE, PATENT COMMENTARIES ANALYZING THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT § 4.02
(2011).
197 Matal, supra note 67, at 450.
198 35 U.S.C. § 102.
199 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.3.4.3 (2013).
200 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (amended 1985).
201 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012).
202 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985); see also MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS, supra note
191, § 9.06; Nova Chems., Inc. v. Sekisui Plastics Co., Ltd., 579 F.3d 319, 327 (3d Cir. 2009).
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secret law also lacks many of the prerequisites for patenting, e.g., inventorship,
novelty, nonobviousness, and submission of an “enabling” patent application
containing a “written description” of the invention, a disclosure of the best mode of
practice known to the inventor, and distinct claims.203 Thus, trade secret law offers
many advantages.
Conversely, if one decides to seek a patent and forgo extended trade secret
protection (beyond the grace period), the risks are that the PTO might not grant a
patent due to, e.g., the novelty or non-obviousness requirements of Sections 102 and
103.204 In addition, every patent will expire, and the claimed invention becomes free
for public to use at a future date.205 Long before that, however, the invention
becomes known in eighteen months unless the applicant makes a “no publication”
request to the PTO.206 As should be clear from the discussion in Section V, the
patent owner might not be able to assert the patent against a competitor who has a
prior user defense, but if that were the case, then trade secret law might not provide
a remedy against that prior user anyway.207 If, however, the competitor obtained the
trade secret via improper means, a remedy would exist, subject to meeting the other
requirements imposed by trade secret jurisprudence.208
Finally, if an innovator determines to rely first on trade secret law and then
seeks patent protection whenever a palpable risk arises that the secret will be made
public, there is neither a clear prohibition against nor sanction for this sequential
approach in the AIA for specified types of inventions.209 However, as of this writing,
there is some risk that courts will rule that a forfeiture and abandonment occurred
and that no patent protection is available, even though the PTO may grant a patent.
Courts could also declare that such a patent is constitutionally infirm because it does
not “promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”210

MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS, supra note 191, § 9.06.
See In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1327, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming the denial of a
patent application for a “nickel-base single-crystal superalloy” because evidence supported the
Board’s determination that the invention “failed to rebut [a] prima facie case of obviousness”); In re
Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (denying a patent application for a “pressure-sensitive
adhesive” composition because the inventor failed to distinguish the chemical identity of his polymer
against a previously known polymer structure).
205 Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., Inc., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945).
206 35 U.S.C. § 122 (b)(2)(B).
207 See supra Section IV.
208 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i) (amended 1985); Carl Pacini & Raymond Placid, The
Importance of State Trade Secret Laws in Deterring Trade Secret Espionage, 7 BUFF. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 101, 117 (2009).
209 See 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012).
210 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); Scott & Williams v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d
1003, 1004 (2d Cir. 1925) (denying patent protection for a seamless stocking that added a “designed
effect” which failed to promote “a new useful discovery or invention”).
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